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In terms of the analyses of individual works, I found the explorations of the
earlier pseudonymous writings (Either-Or, Fear and Trembling and particularly
The Concept of Anxiety) to be more illuminating than the work on the Climacus
literature. However, even in the latter case Dunning's original approach continually produced provocative new insights and perspectives on familiar texts. All
in all, this is a first-rate piece of work-well conceived and carried through.

A Christian View of Justice, by Mark T. Coppenger. Nashville, Tenn.:
Broadman Press, 1983, 173 pages, no index, Paper $6.95.
DAVID A. HOEKEMA, University of Delaware.
Mark Coppenger, a former member of the philosophy faculty at Wheaton College
in Illinois who left the academic world a few years ago to prepare for the ministry,
undertakes in the book under review to relate the pressing questions of social
justice to the theological commitments of evangelical Protestantism. It is a book
which will appeal both to Professor Coppenger's former philosophy students and
to the Reverend Coppenger's parishioners.
Encompassing a wide range of issues in a small book, Coppenger has chosen
to keep his discussion on a relatively elementary level. The five chapters of the
book resemble a series of lectures which might be offered in an undergraduate
course in an evangelical college, and perhaps this resemblance is more than
coincidental. In the first chapter, Coppenger argues that the fatherhood of God
provides the essential foundation for any Christian moral or political theory. A
"father model" of ethics, he urges, rules out either hedonistic utilitarianism or
strict deontological ethics. God demands obedience but at the same time intends,
and ensures, human happiness in the deepest sense. In a second chapter Coppenger
argues that, when we examine those moral issues which are issues of social
justice, the concept of desert provides a basis on which we build the principles
of a just social order.
In the third chapter Coppenger describes what he terms a "matrix that distinguishes among benefits and harms according to whether an individual deserves
to receive or suffer them. Each of the four categories of this schema-deserved
benefit, deserved harm, undeserved benefit, undeserved harm--calls for a particular response from governmental institutions. For example, governments have
a duty to inflict certain kinds of harm on those who deserve it, and this is the
essential character of punishment. Social institutions must also try to prevent
undeserved harm. Widows and orphans, impoverished children, and others who
are the victims of undeserved harm should receive benefits from the state--even
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though they do not, properly speaking, deserve these benefits. The government
also has an obligation to ensure that individuals receive the benefits they deserve,
by requiring employers to pay just wages and by protecting individual's property.
Thus, Coppenger summarizes,
the matrix provides an outline of the principles which compose the
concept of justice. Among these are "Do not harm innocents," "Help
victims," and "Reward responsible workers."
In the remainder of his book Coppenger sketches the application of his understanding of the Christian concept of justice to a wide range of issues. In a single
50-page chapter Coppenger surveys the issues of taxation, wages, welfare, prices,
health care, foreign aid, war, and public education. A closing chapter offers
brief comments on five legal cases dealing with such issues as affirmative action,
pornography, and treatment of the retarded.
The brevity and the clear organization of the book are among its strengths.
Coppenger evidently regards his "matrix model" as the key concept in his vision
of Biblical social justice and as a potentially important conceptual device in
Christian social ethics. I cannot quite share his enthusiasm for this formal schema,
at least in the form in which Coppenger presents it in the present book: it aids
clarity and helps Coppenger structure the chapters of the book, but he does not
employ it in a way that deepens or unifies his analysis of social issues.
The book is marred by a number of regrettable lapses. Coppenger is insensitive
to sexual stereotypes, repeatedly using both "man" and "men" in contexts which
he no doubt intends to include all humanity but which sometimes carry the
suggestion that the normal human being is male. He reassures readers troubled
by his exclusive emphasis on God as father that this "is not meant as a snub to
feminists" but that he is merely following a Scriptural pattern without implying
its suitability for today (p. 16). To dismiss the issue so lightly may offend both
feminist and non-feminist Biblical scholars.
At other points Coppenger's efforts to achieve brevity and clarity lead to
misleading oversimplification. Noting the difficulty of applying the high standards
of Jesus' moral teaching to the activities of governments, Coppenger sweeps the
whole issue aside with the claim that the moral ideals of the Sermon on the
Mount "apply to individual Christians and not to matters of public policy." This
facile dichotomy leads the author to evade many crucial questions about the
relation between morality and political authority, including the questions which
have historically divided Calvinists from Anabaptists.
The specific recommendations made in the last chapters of the book are
interesting and provocative-all the more so because they do not fall neatly into
any particular region of the political map. Coppenger insists on strict enforcement
of laws governing wages, for example, but believes that Biblical justice is
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consistent with any number of different modes and levels of taxation. We must
have systems of welfare (tied to job placement) and national health care, he
argues; yet government should let prices and the distribution of wealth be determined by the marketplace.
Interesting as they are, these views are not clearly rooted in the central theses
of Coppenger's book. Furthermore, Coppenger's account relies on some important assertions-that it is just to kill terrorists pre-emptively (p. 136), and that
the state must "provide the possibility for wealth" (p. 74)-that are put forward
without argument. Certainly one can offer theological as well as philosophical
reasons in support of these assertions, but their truth is by no means self-evident.
Despite these lapses, A Christian View of Justice may serve to advance the
discussion of issues of social justice in the Christian community. A student from
a conservative Christian background struggling to relate religious belief to social
realities might find it particularly helpful. A more critical reader-{)ne aware of
the political divisions in the evangelical wing of the churches, aware of the
challenges of liberation theology and free-market economics-may find instead
that the more difficult problems of relating Christian faith to political action
begin where this discussion ends.

The Cognitivity of Religion: Three Perspectives, by J. Kellenberger. Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985, pp. x + 214.
WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Kellenberger's book examines three approaches to the question of religious
knowledge. "The "First Perspective" insists upon the subjective dimension of
faith, and is "inclined to deny that one can understand religious belief without
believing" (36). The "Second Perspective" maintains that religious attitudes and
practices presuppose "the cognitive belief that God exists" (36), and thinks that
little sense can be made of skepticism, loss of faith and conversion unless one
distinguishes understanding and belief.
The two perspectives also differ in their attitudes towards reason, evidence
and knowledge. The first is "highly suspicious of rationality in religion" (6). It
is reluctant to give evidence a place, and suspects that faith and knowledge are
incompatible. The second values reason, thinks evidence is important, and
believes that faith and knowledge are compatible.
Both perspectives are dominated by the model of "enquiry-rationality." One's
beliefs are rational when one has evidence for them, and adopts them after
investigating to see what evidence there is. "What is at issue is correct reasoning

